1

Introduction
Countries that fear the economic disruptions that accompany capital flows are often tempted to impose controls on international capital movements. These controls can take many forms, and the debate on their efficacy in promoting or deterring growth has received widespread attention. The same countries are also typically concerned with attracting foreign direct investment due to the presumed salutary effects of such investment. The efficacy of mechanisms to attract foreign direct investment and the actual benefits of foreign direct investment are likewise the subject of extensive research. The potential inconsistency of the desire to control capital movements and the desire to attract inbound foreign direct investment has, however, received limited attention, in spite of its obvious policy relevance.
This paper analyzes the effects of capital controls and liberalizations on the behavior of American multinational firms. Analysis of multinational firm responses to capital controls and liberalizations opens up several lines of inquiry. First, do capital controls (and liberalizations) change the cost of capital for firms? An investigation of the borrowing rates faced by the same firm around the world promises to isolate the impact of capital controls on local interest rates.
Second, do the internal product and capital markets of multinational firms allow these firms to circumvent capital controls? Recent evidence suggests that these internal markets are particularly advantageous to multinational firms in settings where there are local distortions.
How is such evasion accomplished and how do efforts at evasion in response to capital controls compare to the responses to income taxes? Finally, for countries interested in attracting foreign direct investment but tempted to impose capital controls, what is the magnitude of this tradeoff?
The paper offers evidence in response to each of these lines of inquiry: local borrowing rates are considerably higher in countries imposing capital controls; multinationals distort reported trade patterns, profitability, and dividend repatriations in order to mitigate their impact;
and the combination of the costly nature of this evasion and the higher cost of capital significantly reduce foreign direct investment in capital control countries. Specifically, borrowing rates are 5.4 percent higher in countries imposing capital controls than they are elsewhere for the affiliates of the same multinational parents. The distortions to reported profitability are comparable to those incurred in response to 24% differences in corporate tax 2 rates and dividend repatriations are regularized to facilitate the extraction of profits from countries imposing capital controls. As a result of the costly nature of the circumvention and higher cost of capital, investment is less profitable and American firms respond by reducing by 13-16 percent the size of their affiliates in countries with capital controls. Liberalizations of capital account restrictions are characterized by reversals of these patterns.
Investigations of firm-level responses to capital controls must struggle with the fact that capital controls are not randomly distributed among nations. Countries imposing capital controls typically do so in response to macroeconomic events that are thought to carry worse implications in the absence of capital controls than they would when accompanied by capital controls. Hence the measured effect of capital controls on foreign investment may reflect the impact of omitted variables that affect investment and are correlated with the desire to control capital flows. Since there is a shortage of available instruments for the adoption (or liberalization) of capital controls, the avoidance behavior of American firms offers clearer, and more subtle, evidence of their impact. For example, foreign affiliates whose annual profit remittances are controlled are significantly more likely than other affiliates to remit what they can each year, in spite of the associated tax and resource-allocation costs. Similarly, the same affiliates have 4.7 percent lower profit rates than do comparable affiliates in countries without capital controls, and report trade patterns with parent companies that account for almost half of their lower profits. These avoidance actions are costly, which is why they are not commonly undertaken by affiliates in countries that do not impose capital controls. The fact that American multinationals are willing to incur the associated costs is a reflection of the even greater costs associated with capital controls.
Studies of capital controls and capital account liberalizations must also struggle with the difficulty of measuring precisely the nature of capital controls. While the paper also employs a traditional measure of capital account restrictions, the analysis emphasizes a measure of capital account restrictions that is specifically associated with the activities of multinational firms. As a result, this analysis of multinational firm responses to capital account restrictions is tied closely to the restrictions that these particular firms face.
3 Consideration of the ways in which multinational firms respond to capital controls and liberalizations illuminates both the aggregate and distributional consequences of these regulations. While the evidence on interest rates and investment responses of multinational firms adds new evidence on the effects of capital controls on overall economic activity, the evidence on avoidance suggests that multinational firms can circumvent some of these regulations. These mechanisms of evasion -access to their internal product and capital markets -are uniquely available to multinational firms suggesting that capital controls are likely to have distributional consequences as well as aggregate consequences. As such, capital account liberalizations may even the playing field between multinational firms, who can partially sidestep capital account restrictions, and local firms, that may not have such options. Capital account liberalizations are likely to be important for both the composition and level of investment.
Section 2 of the paper reviews the empirical literature on the impact of capital account restrictions and liberalizations and ties the paper's results to the open questions in the literature.
Section 3 offers an overview of the data employed in the analysis and describes aggregate patterns of multinational activity and capital account regulations. Section 4 presents empirical evidence of the effects of capital account restrictions on local interest rates, profit extraction, and investment levels. Section 5 is the conclusion.
Capital Controls, Liberalizations and Economic Growth
There is a sizable macroeconomic and finance literature that considers the effect of capital account restrictions on aggregate investment and a growing literature on the distributional consequences of capital account restrictions. An analysis of multinational responses to these regulations builds on and contributes to both these literatures.
Investment responses to capital controls and liberalizations
Eichengreen (2002) Bhagwati (1998) . The more optimistic view of capital account liberalization is advanced by Fischer (1998) , and supported by evidence provided in Quinn (1997) . Using an index subsequently adopted by many authors, Quinn reports a significant positive correlation between changes in his measure of capital account openness and subsequent economic growth.
The salience of these issues for policy makers has motivated work attempting to disentangle the reasons for these contradictory findings. In particular, researchers have focused on the distinctive nature of these measures (as in Edwards (2001)), the possibility that capital liberalization operates differently for countries of different income levels (as in Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) , which can be compared to Grilli and Millesi-Ferreti (1995) ), the role of preexisting policies and the role of sequencing in determining the effects of capital control liberalizations (as in Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) and Chinn and Ito (2002) ), and the role of political institutions in dictating outcomes associated with capital account liberalizations (as in Quinn, Inclan and Toyoda (2001) ). The effect of capital account liberalizations in stimulating economic growth and investment remains an open question.
Finance scholars have emphasized the effects of stock market liberalizations on investment using firm-level data. Following the intuition of Stulz (1995 Stulz ( , 1999 , Henry (2000) , Bekeart and Harvey (2000) , and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2002) find that stock market liberalizations in a set of emerging market countries are followed by investment booms by local firms listed on equity markets. Chari and Henry (2002) confirm the existence of investment booms, but find no evidence that the distribution of investment subsequent to a liberalization follows the predictions associated with the repricing of systematic risk. As such, investment booms may be more associated with reductions in the risk-free interest rate than with repricing of equity risk. Multinational responses to capital controls and liberalizations can shed light on the mechanisms underlying this investment boom by analyzing their investment behavior directly and by analyzing how the borrowing costs of the same borrower vary around the world as a function of capital controls. 5
The distributional consequences of capital controls
In addition to the aggregate effects described above, it is possible that capital controls distort the composition of investment and firm activity in country. Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) both characterize capital controls as one example of a financial regulation that can have important distributional consequences across firms within a country. Specifically, they argue that capital controls can favor entrenched firms and that these firms then lobby for their preservation. Johnson and Mitton (2003) demonstrate the nature of these distributional consequences by examining how political connections are linked to firm performance under capital controls in the case of Malaysia.
The distributional consequences of capital account policies need not arise from political connections alone. Forbes (2002) shows how small firms suffered during the Chilean encaje suggesting that the consequences of these regulations may be quite heterogeneous across firms due to access to capital markets. Similarly, Auguste et al. (2003) 1983-1988, all affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income less than $10 million were exempt, and this cutoff increased to $15 million from 1990-1993 and $20 million in 1995. BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when only certain affiliates provide information on particular survey forms. Estimated data is unlikely to have a significant impact on the BEA's published data at the industry or country level as data based on actual reports exceeds 90 percent of the estimated totals of assets and sales in each of the years between 1982 and 1995. To avoid working with estimated data, only affiliates required to provide all the information associated with a particular analysis are considered. 4 Affiliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating country tax rates. For a more comprehensive description of the calculation of affiliate tax rates, see Desai, Foley and Hines (2001) . In particular, these income tax rates do not include withholding taxes on cross-border interest payments to related parties, since such taxes are endogenous to interest payments and in any case immediately creditable against home-country tax liabilities. Desai and Hines (1999) report that adjusting country tax rates for withholding taxes does not affect the estimated impact of taxation on affiliate borrowing, due to the combination of creditability and low withholding tax rates on related-party interest payments. 8 0 and 1, with higher values indicating greater risk. 5 Similarly, the Rate of Inflation is the contemporaneous percentage change in a host country's GDP deflator.
The BEA data also contain information on the interest expense associated with affiliate debt, and it is possible to use this information to calculate an affiliate's average interest rate in a year. Because the data do not contain detailed information on interest rates charged on individual loans or on which types of debt are interest-bearing, the analysis uses two estimates of interest rates. The first measure is the Interest Rate on External Borrowing, which is calculated by dividing affiliate interest payments to non-parents by current liabilities and long-term debt borrowed from non-parent sources. This variable has a mean of 4.9 percent. One of the reasons that this average interest rate appears low is that the broad measure of debt used in this calculation includes trade credit which is often non-interest bearing. 6 The second interest rate is the Interest Rate on Non-Trade Account Borrowing, which is the ratio of total interest paid to a measure of current liabilities and long term debt that excludes trade accounts and trade notes payable. This alternative interest rate variable has a mean of 7.9 percent. This variable includes interest payments to parents and external sources in the numerator and total debt in the denominator. Table 2 provides detail on the two measures of capital account restrictions employed in the statistical analysis that follows. 7 The IMF measure is the one most commonly used in the literature and, as documented in Table 2 , is one that classifies many countries as having capital controls during the 1980s and 1990s. 8 The IMF capital control classification is a yes-no measure, based on multiple aspects of a country's capital account restrictions, not all of them relevant to multinational firms. It is useful to consider an alternative to the IMF classification that emphasizes restrictions that are important to foreign investors; fortunately, Shatz (2000) 9 provides one such measure for the period 1985 -1996 . Shatz (2000 details measures of openness to FDI for a sample of 57 countries along a number of dimensions. Two of these are restrictions on capital repatriation and restrictions on profit remittance. Capital account restrictions obtained from these data are coded as a dummy variable equal to one if either of the restrictions are rated two or less, indicating policies that impose strict time or quantity limits on the ability of affiliates to move funds out of the host country.
The comparison between the measures in Table 2 The middle panel of Table 1 
Capital Account Restrictions and Foreign Direct Investment
In order to isolate the impact of capital controls on the performance of American multinational firms, this section begins by considering one of the most basic elements of the cost of functioning under these regimes -the local borrowing environment. This analysis has the advantage of identifying how interest costs for the same borrower vary because of these regimes.
This analysis of interest rates is followed by an examination of the degree to which multinational firms circumvent capital controls through various mechanisms. Finally, the paper considers the overall effect of capital controls by presenting estimates of the impact of capital controls on investment levels. by Shatz is associated with 7.9 percent higher interest rates. Since the sample mean interest rate is just five percent, these are sizable effects.
Interest rates
The regressions reported in columns 3-8 of Table 3 add independent variables in order to control for observable affiliate and country attributes that might contribute to interest rate differences. In the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4, greater political riskiness and higher rates of local inflation are both associated with higher (dollar-denominated) interest rates, in both cases interpretable as reflecting the impact of greater uncertainty over the likelihood and level of ultimate repayment. After controlling for these additional variables, capital controls as measured by the IMF are associated with 1.2 percent higher interest rates, while capital controls as measured by Shatz are associated with 5.4 percent higher interest rates.
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The regressions presented in columns 1-4 of Table 3 indicate that interest rates are higher in countries with capital controls. It is noteworthy that, since parent company fixed effects are included as independent variables, these interest rate effects appear between affiliates of the same companies. This evidence is, however, subject to the limitation that the denominator of the interest rate variable is total liabilities, including trade credits on which explicit interest is seldom paid. As a result, measured interest rates are somewhat low and may vary between countries due to trade financing practices.
Columns five through eight of Table 3 report estimated coefficients from regressions designed to address this issue. The dependent variable is again the interest rate, in this case constructed as the ratio of total affiliate interest payments to other current liabilities and longterm debt, excluding trade accounts. The estimated capital market effects obtained using this dependent variable, reported in columns five and six of Table 3 , have the same signs and almost exactly the same magnitudes as those obtained using the first interest rate variable and reported in columns three and four of Table 3 .
Data limitations make it impossible to measure average interest rates paid to external sources when the denominator of the calculated interest rate excludes trade account debt. It is nonetheless possible to evaluate circuitously the difference between interest rates on parent loans and local loans, and the effect of capital controls on this difference, using a measure of interest rates that does not include trade account debt. Columns seven and eight of Table 3 present estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the same as that in the regressions reported in columns five and six, but adds two independent variables: the share of debt from non-parent sources, 11 and the interaction between this share and measures of capital controls. If the cost of capital is higher in countries imposing capital controls, then the coefficient on the interaction between the share of debt from local sources and capital control measures should be positive, reflecting the extent of the difference.
The results indicate that greater borrowing from non-parent sources is associated with higher interest rates in countries imposing capital controls. The 0.0314 coefficient on the interaction of the IMF capital control measure and the share of debt borrowed from non-parent 12 sources, reported in column 7, implies that interest rates on external debt (measured exclusive of trade credit) are 3.1 percent higher in countries with capital controls. The 0.0619 coefficient reported in column eight implies that interest rates are 6.2 percent higher in countries with capital controls as measured by Shatz. Since the mean interest rate (so defined) is 7.7 percent, these are sizable effects and consistent with the earlier analysis.
Profit extraction
Multinational firms whose affiliates are located in countries with capital controls have incentives to find creative ways to extract profits for deployment elsewhere. Profits can be relocated by changing the locations in which they are reported, and by changing patterns of profit remittances much as multinational firms respond to taxation.
Transfer pricing
It is possible for multinational firms to sidestep repatriation restrictions by manipulating the prices at which foreign affiliates trade with their American parent companies, since overinvoicing exports from the United States, or underinvoicing imports to the United States, serves to relocate profits. The same tactics reduce total tax liabilities when used to relocate taxable income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Governments typically insist that firms use arm's length prices in trade with other members of the same controlled group, but such prices are notoriously difficult to enforce, particularly when (as is often the case for multinational firms) traded goods have unique characteristics that make it difficult to identify perfectly comparable items. As a result, affiliates located in countries with high tax rates or binding repatriation controls are likely to run sizable trade deficits with their parent companies, since firms have incentives to structure and record such trades in ways that relocate as many profits as possible. There is an extensive literature that analyzes patterns of reported profitability by American multinational firms, finding that transactions appear to be structured in ways that reduce total tax liabilities.
12 11 The share of debt from non-parent sources equals one minus the ratio of current liabilities and long-term debt owed to the parent to total current liabilities and long-term debt. 12 See, for example, Grubert and Mutti (1991) .
13 Table 4 presents results of specifications similar to those used to study the impact of taxes in which the dependent variable is the rate of return on affiliate equity. The sample covers all years from 1982 to 1995. In a smoothly functioning competitive market the expected rate of return should be the same everywhere, but in a setting in which firms systematically understate profits earned in high-tax countries and in countries with capital controls, there should be a negative association between profit rates and tax rates or the use of capital controls.
The -0.2075 coefficient reported in column one of Table 4 implies that ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 2.1 percent lower profit rates, controlling for parent company, Table 5 analyze the effect of capital controls on a measure of the trade balance of U.S. parents with affiliates in particular industry/country/year cells. The dependent variable in these specifications is a ratio, the numerator of which is the difference between total exports by U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates and total imports from foreign affiliates to their U.S. parents; the denominator is the sum of these exports and imports. This variable is calculated by summing trade between parents and affiliates in country/industry/year cells over the 1982-1995 period, and omitting cells for which there is zero trade (and for which the ratio has a denominator of zero). Clausing (2001) develops this measure at an aggregate country level and employs it to explore the extent to which firms relocate profits in response to local tax incentives.
Tax rate differences encourage American parent companies to run larger trade surpluses with their affiliates in high-tax countries than with those in low-tax countries, since doing so reduces total tax burdens. The estimated positive coefficients on the tax rate variable in the regressions reported in Table 5 are consistent with these incentives, and indeed, are consistent with the aggregate country results reported by Clausing (2001) . In the regression reported in column one, ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 3.7 percent greater parent trade surpluses, controlling for industry and year fixed effects, three powers of log GDP, and median employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals. The estimated tax effect is little changed by the introduction of capital control measures in the regressions reported in columns 2-3.
Capital controls as measured by the IMF are associated with 3.2 percent greater parent trade surpluses, though this effect is marginally significant; the Shatz capital control variable is associated with a larger 7.1 percent impact on parent trade surpluses.
It is instructive to relate the measured trade effect of capital controls as captured by the Shatz variable to the profit shifting results above. The 0.0708 and 0.3793 coefficients in the regression reported in column three of Table 4 implies that aggregate reported affiliate profits would be reduced by $39 billion if all countries adopted capital controls. Hence the observable effect on trade with parent companies accounts for slightly less than half of the measured impact of capital controls on affiliate profitability. Since affiliates are able to use financing devices, trade with related parties other than parent companies, and other methods to relocate reported profits, the evidence of capital control effects on profitability and trade surpluses is quite consistent.
Dividend repatriations
Firms that are restricted in their ability to remit dividends commonly find that the shadow value of local retained earnings is less than the value of capital deployed elsewhere, so they have incentives to remove profits if possible. Capital controls typically include repatriation restrictions that operate on annual bases, thereby indirectly encouraging affiliates to remit dividends to their parent companies every year, lest low-cost repatriation opportunities otherwise be lost. In order to investigate the extent to which firms respond to this incentive, the regressions reported in Table 6 are logit specifications in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if an affiliate pays a dividend to its parent in a particular year, and zero otherwise. The sample again covers the 1982-1995 period. Country tax rates are included as independent variables (since higher tax rates generally reduce the cost of paying dividends to American parent companies), as are parent and year fixed effects, three powers of log GDP, and median employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals.
The regression reported in column one of Table 6 indicates that higher country tax rates and higher affiliate return on assets are associated with significantly greater likelihoods of paying dividends. The regressions reported in columns 2-3 of Table 6 indicate that the chances of paying a dividend are significantly higher in countries with capital control countries as measured both by the IMF and by Shatz. The 0.3589 coefficient in column three implies that the imposition of capital controls (as measured by Shatz) has the same effect on the likelihood of 16 paying dividends as does a 7.7 percent higher return on assets, or a 35 percent higher local tax rate. Since the mean return on assets is 5.7 percent, and the mean tax rate is 34 percent, these are sizable effects.
Columns 4-5 of Table 6 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the sample is restricted to affiliates in countries that remove capital controls, and the inclusion of affiliate fixed effects implies that the impact of capital controls is identified on the basis of changes induced by their removal. The sample size is considerably smaller than the samples used for the estimation reported in columns 1-3. The estimated tax effects reported in columns 4-5, which are likewise estimated based on changes, are somewhat larger than those reported in columns 1-3, while the estimated impact of changes in return on assets is of comparable size.
The -0.5701 coefficient reported in column five indicates that the removal of capital controls is associated with significantly reduced likelihood of remitting dividends to parent companies. The estimated impact of capital account liberalization is equal in magnitude to that of 14 percent lower return on assets or 25 percent lower tax rates.
Firms with incentives to repatriate funds on a regular basis are likely to have dividend streams that are less responsive to changing conditions than are remittances by unconstrained affiliates. In order to test this possibility, it is convenient to estimate a standard Lintner model of dividend payments by foreign affiliates, 13 in which current dividends are regressed on current after-tax income and lagged dividends. The concept behind the Lintner model is that target dividend levels are functions of current income, but that actual dividends adjust only slowly to desired dividends. The estimated adjustment parameter is equal to one minus the coefficient on lagged dividends, while the estimated steady state dividend payout ratio equals the ratio of the coefficient on net income and the adjustment parameter.
The results indicate that dividend repatriations adjust more slowly to income changes in capital control countries than they do in other countries. Columns 1-6 of Table 7 Columns 5-6 of Table 7 report estimates using the Shatz measure of capital controls, and in these specifications, adjustment parameters and implied steady-state payout ratios differ sharply between affiliates located in capital control countries and affiliates located elsewhere. percent, compared with payout ratios of 54 percent for other affiliates. Since countries imposing capital controls typically limit the size of permitted dividend repatriations, it is not surprising that there is little difference in implied steady-state payout ratios. What is more telling is that dividend repatriations respond more sluggishly to income changes in countries with capital controls, which is consistent with behavior that is driven by a desire to extract profits.
Columns 7-10 of Table 7 report coefficients from dividend payout equations estimated on the sample of affiliates located in countries that liberalize their capital account restrictions during the sample period. The estimated effects of net income and lagged dividends are similar to those reported in columns 1-6, while the interaction of the post liberalization dummy variable and lagged dividends is negative, implying that dividends exhibit considerably less persistence in post-liberalization periods. The results reported in columns 9 and 10 imply much smaller dividend adjustment parameters in periods without capital controls, which is consistent with the evidence reported in Table 6 and with the incentives created by repatriation restrictions.
Investment
If either local borrowing rates were unaffected by capital controls or if capital control evasion technologies were costless, investment by multinational firms need not be affected by capital controls. As demonstrated above, however, the macroeconomic effects of capital controls include elevating interest rates to levels that may make local debt finance unattractive. Similarly, Tables 4-7 indicate that firms engage in costly avoidance strategies that are comparable to the strategies they employ in response to significant differences in tax rates. Given the various other tax and non-tax motivations that would otherwise guide dividend repatriation policies and intercompany income allocation, these actions are likely costly. Consequently, it is useful to examine if capital controls are accompanied by reduced foreign investment levels in order to fully characterize the effect of capital controls on multinational activity. Table 8 presents estimates of the effects of capital controls on the magnitude of foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals. The sample consists of affiliates the first time that they appear in the BEA data between 1983-1995, so each affiliate is included just once. The specifications reported in columns 1-3 include dummy variables for multinational parents, affiliate industry, and years, as well as three powers of log GDP and median employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals. The -0.3020 coefficient on country tax rates implies that ten percent higher tax rates are associated with three percent smaller affiliates, an effect and magnitude that is consistent with the evidence reported in the literature on tax effects on foreign direct investment. The -0.1590 coefficient in column 2 of Table 8 indicates that affiliate assets (at first appearance) are 15.9 percent smaller in countries with capital controls as measured by the IMF than they are in countries without capital controls; estimates using the Shatz capital control measure, reported in column 3, imply that affiliates in capital control countries are 12.7 percent smaller.
14 Columns 4-5 of Table 8 present estimates of the determinants of asset size changes for affiliates in countries that liberalize their capital account restrictions. These regressions include observations of affiliates not just at their first appearances but throughout the sample, though they are limited to affiliates located in countries that remove capital controls. The specifications include affiliate fixed effects and year dummies as independent variables, so the effects of tax Hines (2001, 2002) . 14 All standard errors presented in the tables are clustered at the country-year level.
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rates and capital controls are identified from changes rather than levels. The estimated tax rate effects are paradoxically positive, though the 0.1562 coefficient on the post liberalization dummy variable in the regression reported in column five is quite consistent with the magnitudes of the estimated effects reported in columns 2-3.
The results reported in Table 8 imply that affiliates located in countries with capital controls are undercapitalized by their parent firms relative to affiliates located in other countries.
The effect of initial undercapitalization is likely to be exaggerated over the subsequent history of an affiliate, as multinational firms attempt to redirect resources from affiliates in countries with capital controls to other parts of the firm. Table 9 presents regressions that track this dynamic, using data from the 1982, 1989, and 1994 Benchmark Surveys. The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of retained earnings to total affiliate assets, and the independent variables include local tax rates, dummy variables for multinational parents, affiliate industries, and years, three powers of log GDP, and median employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals.
Capital controls are associated with reduced retained earnings in the specifications reported in columns 2-3, the -0.0661 coefficient in column three corresponding to 6.6 percent lower ratios of retained earnings to total assets. Since the mean ratio is 17.9 percent, it follows that this is a sizable effect, and that multinational affiliates in countries with capital controls not only begin with fewer assets than other affiliates, but also accumulate retained earnings at slower rates.
Conclusion
This paper offers evidence that the affiliates of American multinational firms circumvent capital controls by regularizing dividends and relocating profits. These acts of evasion are not costless given the various other tax and non-tax motivations that would otherwise guide these policies. Capital control countries are also characterized by significantly higher borrowing costs for the same multinational firm. Taken together, the increased cost of capital and the costly nature of the avoidance lead to significantly lower levels of investment. Capital account liberalizations are associated with reversals in these patterns.
The evidence provided in this paper suffers from a common difficulty in understanding the effects of capital control policies on investment and firms. Given that countries imposing capital controls differ in many ways from those that do not, it is impossible to control for all the 20 relevant differences in evaluating the impact of capital controls. Put concretely, the smaller asset demands of American affiliates in countries imposing capital controls might stem either from the capital controls themselves or from the economic conditions that motivated governments to impose the controls. Having said that, the finer details of multinational behavior, including the effect of capital controls on transfer pricing and dividend repatriations, does provide an advantage in this regard. These subtler tests imply that firms behave in a manner that is consistent with higher local costs of capital, suggesting that the observed effects on assets and retained earnings reflect the impact of policies and not the conditions responsible for the policies.
In addition to providing a window on the aggregate effects of capital controls and liberalizations on investment behavior, the evidence on how multinationals employ internal markets to circumvent these controls suggest that capital controls have distributional consequences. As with other policy actions, less mobile factors likely bear the burden of these actions disproportionately. Consequently, capital controls both raise the costs of capital for local firms but also likely handicap them relative to the multinational firms they are competing against. Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise. The Interest Rate on External Borrowing is the ratio of the affiliate interest payments to non-parents to current liabilities and long-term debt borrowed from non-parent sources. The Interest Rate on Non-Trade Account Borrowing is the ratio of total affiliate interest payments to current liabilities and long-term debt, excluding trade accounts and trade notes payable. Share of Debt from Non-Parent Sources is the share of affiliate current liabilities and long-term debt owed to lenders other than the affiliate's parent. Private Credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999). Political Risk is the annual average of the monthly index of political risk presented in the International Country Risk Guide, rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 with higher numbers indicating higher risks. Rate of Inflation is the contemporaneous percentage change in the GDP deflator of an affiliate's host country. 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Notes: The top panel provides the number count, median sales, median assets and median employees for all affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the sample for 1982 , 1989 , 1994 . In 1982 , 1989 , and 1994 , Benchmark Surveys were conducted and, consequently, the cutoff for inclusion in the sample is lower than other years as discussed in the text. The top panel also provides the share of affiliates, assets, sales and employees in countries with capital controls as characterized by the IMF and Shatz measures discussed in the text. The bottom panel reports descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the regression analysis. Parent trade surplus is equal to the difference between parent exports to the affiliate and parent imports from the affiliate divided by the sum of these two values. Net income, owners' equity, dividends, assets, and retained earnings are all measured in thousands of nominal U.S. dollars. The mean and standard deviation of Net Income/Owners' Equity are calculated using analytical weights where weights are set equal to owners' equity. Dividend Dummy is equal to one if an affiliate pays a dividend in a particular year and zero otherwise. Return on Assets is the ratio of net income to assets. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country. The IMF Capital Argentina 1982 -1992 1982 -1989 Italy 1982 -1989 Australia 1982 -1984 Jamaica 1982 -1995 Austria 1982 -1990 Japan Bahamas 1982 -1995 Korea 1982 -1995 Barbados 1982 -1995 Malaysia Belgium-Luxembourg Mexico 1982 -1995 Brazil 1982 -1995 1982 -1991 Netherlands Canada Netherlands Antilles 1982 -1995 Chile 1982 -1995 1982 -1991 New Zealand 1982 -1983 China 1982 -1995 1982 -1995 Nigeria 1982 -1995 1982 -1995 Colombia 1982 -1995 1982 -1991 Norway 1982 -1994 Costa Rica 1982 -1994 Panama Denmark 1982 -1987 Peru 1984 -1992 1982 -1992 Dominican Republic 1982 -1995 1982 -1995 Philippines 1982 -1995 1982 -1991 Ecuador 1986 -1987 , 1993 -1994 1982 -1992 Portugal 1982 -1992 Egypt 1982 -1995 1982 -1991 Saudi Arabia Finland 1982 -1990 Singapore France 1982 -1989 South Africa 1982 -1995 Germany Spain 1982 -1993 Greece 1982 -1995 1982 -1986 Sweden 1982 -1992 Guatemala 1982 -1988 Switzerland none in 1992 -1995 , other years NA Honduras 1982 -1992 Thailand 1982 -1995 Hong Kong Trinidad and Tobago 1982 -1993 India 1982 -1995 1982 -1995 Turkey 1982 -1995 Indonesia United Arab Emirates Ireland 1982 -1991 United Kingdom Israel 1982 -1995 Venezuela 1984 -1995 1982 -1989 Notes: The table provides the years for which the IMF and Shatz characterize countries as having capital controls, as discussed in the text, for those countries studied by Shatz. Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the ratio of the value of affiliate interest payments to non-parents to current liabilities and long-term debt borrowed from non-parent sources; in columns 5-8, the dependent variable is the ratio of total affiliate interest payments to current liabilities and long-term debt, excluding trade accounts and trade notes payable. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and include parent, industry, and year fixed effects. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country. Private Credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999 Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is the ratio of net income to owners' equity. The analysis uses analytic weights equal to owners equity to transform the specifications in a way that is equivalent to multiplying through by owners' equity. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country. The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise. Specification (1)-(3) include parent, industry, and year fixed effects and observations for all affiliate years, and as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year. Specifications (4) and (5) include affiliate and year fixed effects and observations from countries that undergo capital control liberalizations. The post liberalization dummy is equal to one in the year of and each of the years following liberalizations. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering across country/year cells are presented in parentheses. Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is a dummy that is equal to one if an affiliate makes a dividend payment in a particular year and zero if it does not. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country. The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise. Return on assets is the ratio of affiliate net income to assets. Specification (1)-(3) include Parent/Year fixed effects and observations for all affiliate years, and as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year. Specifications (4) and (5) include affiliate and year fixed effects and observations from countries that undergo capital control liberalizations. The post liberalization dummy is equal to one in the year of and each of the years following liberalizations. Standard errors are presented in parenthesess.
Capital Control Measure
The Impact of Capital Controls on the Propensity of U.S. Multinationals to Pay Dividends Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the dollar value of dividend payments by majority-owned affiliates to parents. Net Income is the after-foreign tax net income of the affiliate. Lagged Dividends is the dollar value of dividend payments by the affiliate in the previous year. The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 present OLS specifications with parent fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 present OLS specifications with affiliate fixed effects. The sample used in specifications 1-6 includes all affiliates and the sample in specifications 7-10 includes only affiliates in countries that liberalize their capital controls. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses. Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is the log of affiliate assets. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country. The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise. Specification (1)-(3) include parent, industry, and year fixed effects and observations for the first appearce of all affiliates subsequent to 1982, as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year. Specifications (4) and (5) include affiliate and year fixed effects and observations from countries that undergo capital control liberalizations. The post liberalization dummy is equal to one in the year of and each of the years following liberalizations. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering across country/year cells are presented in parentheses.
Liberalizing Countries
The Impact of Capital Controls on Multinational Affiliate Size Table 9 Benchmark Years
The Impact of Capital Controls on the Retained Earnings of Multinational Affiliates
The dependent variable in each specification is the ratio of retained earnings to assets. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country. The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise. All specification include parent, industry, and year fixed effects and observations for all benchmark years, as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering across country/year cells are presented in parentheses.
